The U.S.
Introduction
Social Security covers almost the entire U.S. population, providing participants and their spouses with retirement, disability, and other benefits during different stages of life. Social Security is currently the largest single outlay in the U.S. federal budget and it is judged by many to be one of the most successful programs in U.S. history. Although Social Security replaces only about 40 percent of annual earnings prior to retirement on average, it provides an important "first pillar" of retirement income. Social Security is often credited with reducing poverty among the elderly in the United States (Engelhardt and Gruber, 2004) .
Participation in Social Security is mandatory for most occupations.
1 Social Security is financed by a 12.4 percent payroll tax on covered earnings up to a limit ($87,900 in 2004) that increases each year with the economy-wide average wage. This tax is split evenly between employer and employee. Participants earn "fully insured" status after they contributed for 40 calendar quarters. Fully insured participants do not accrue a contractual right to specific amounts of benefits. 2 Instead, they earn a non-contractual right to benefits that are payable according to the laws in effect at the time--laws that are subject to change by Congress.
Thus, Social Security is a "defined benefit" plan where a retiree's benefit is determined by a specific formula applied to his or her wage history. In contrast, periodic withdrawals from a voluntary tax-favored retirement plans --401(k), 403(b), Keogh, and others --generate retirement income based directly on a person's previous contributions and subsequent returns.
Whereas withdrawals from voluntary tax-favored retirement plans are fully funded by previous contributions, Social Security was mostly financed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis between 1 A notable exception includes state workers who are covered by state pension programs. 2 See the U.S. Supreme Court case, Nestor vs. Flemming, 1960 (363 U.S. 603) .
1 the 1940s and the early 1980s: payroll tax revenue collected each year was paid out almost immediately as benefits rather than saved. This financing structure meant that those who retired shortly after Social Security was launched received more benefits from Social Security in present value than they paid in past taxes. These windfalls continued as the Social Security program's coverage and benefits expanded after 1950 until well into the 1970s (Geanakoplos, et al., 1998) .
Unfortunately, the windfalls to previous generations do not come for free: they must be paid for by future generations who receive lower rates of return on their payroll taxes compared to the rates they could have earned if they instead invested their contributions in government bonds. In fact, all future generations are worse off (Breyer, 1989) . 
Building the Trust Fund
During the early 1980s, the independent Office of the Actuary at the Social Security Administration projected that revenues would fall short of benefit outlays during the early part of the twenty-first century, largely due to the retirement of "Baby Boomers." While Baby Boomers have contributed significantly to the labor force during the past several decades, they will soon retire and the number of workers alive to support retirees will decrease substantially. As shown in Figure 1 , today there are almost five people of working age (between 20 and 64) for each retiree age 65 and over. By 2030, the number of working-aged people per retiree will decline to less than three; by 2080, the ratio will decline to about two.
The Social Security Act, therefore, was amended in 1983 in an attempt to increase the system's cash flow over the subsequent 75 years. The amendments raised payroll taxes, subjected benefits to income taxation, and scheduled a gradual increase in the full retirement age from 65 to 67 beginning in 2003. These changes have generated surpluses since 1983 that are deposited into the Social Security trust fund. The investment of these surpluses into Treasury securities has resulted in the accumulation of $1.6 trillion in the program's trust fund.
Despite these reforms, the Social Security system is still mostly pay-as-you-go financed.
Although $1.6 trillion appears to be a large number, it is sufficient to pay current retirees their scheduled benefits for just three years. Had the 1983 Amendments "fully funded" the Social Security system, the trust fund would hold about $12.7 trillion today. In that case, contributions by past and current generations would have been sufficient to cover their own benefits, and no burden would have to be imposed on future generations.
Future Shortfalls Projected --Again
Although the 1983 Amendments were projected at the time to have resolved Social Security's financial shortfalls during the subsequent 75 years, projected imbalances began appearing soon thereafter. As shown in Figure 2 , payroll tax surpluses are currently projected to continue until 2018 -the so-called "crossover" date -after which projected benefits will exceed revenues. The trust fund will then be gradually depleted to cover the cash flow shortfalls and it is expected to be exhausted by 2042.
The Social Security Trustees project that the program's present value of benefits under current law over the next 75 years will exceed by $3.7 trillion the present value of its payroll tax revenues plus the current value of the trust fund. The present value calculation discounts future financial shortfalls at the government's borrowing rate. In other words, if the government deposited an additional $3.7 trillion immediately into the trust fund by raising taxes or reducing spending, it would be able pay benefits scheduled under current law during the next 75 years.
An infusion of funds into the trust fund would also increase public and national saving if it were not re-borrowed and spent on other government programs-a topic of recent debate. 4 If the new monies were entirely spent on other programs, the government's overall capacity to pay future benefits would not increase even though the trust fund would be larger.
One reason that 75-year imbalances reappeared after 1983 is due to the "moving window" phenomenon. In 1983, the 75-year projected window ended at 2057 whereas today it ends in 2078. Most of the $3.7 trillion imbalance comes from simply moving the 75-year window to cover the years 2058 through 2078 when cash flow shortfalls are projected.
The problem of a "moving window" implies that reforms that produce solvency over just 75 years will soon begin to exhibit insolvency again as the window continues to move forward into the future. As shown in the first panel in Table 1, Whereas the concept of solvency has typically been used to determine whether the government can afford to pay benefits over the next 75 years, the concept of sustainability refers to the ability to pay benefits into the indefinite future. A Social Security reform that achieves solvency over a limited horizon but not sustainability will soon fail to even achieve solvency as the time window moves to include future years. However, a reform that is projected to be sustainable is also projected to be solvent during future years. Under current conditions, achieving sustainability is harder than achieving solvency because sustainability requires making an additional $6.7 trillion in adjustments in order to address the shortfalls after 2078.
An ad-hoc measure of sustainability that is routinely used by the government involves determining whether the following two conditions are satisfied. 
Bias in Policy Making
The traditional ad-hoc measure of sustainability, therefore, has important shortcomings.
But probably the most important weakness of this and other traditional measures of Social
Security's finances is that these measures introduce a bias in policymaking. In particular, reforms that could actually reduce Social Security's $10.4 trillion imbalance -improving Social Security's long-run sustainability -often worsen each of the more traditional measures, including the trust fund exhaustion date, the crossover date, and the 75-year imbalance.
Consider the following reform known as an "actuarially-fair carve out." Social Security participants would be allowed to "carve out" some of their payroll taxes and deposit them into a personal account that would be used to augment their traditional benefit. Since these participants 7 Diamond and Orszag (2004) , however, advocate continuing to increase payroll tax rates after year 75.
would now be contributing less to the traditional system, their traditional benefit would be reduced by an "actuarially-fair" amount equal to one dollar in present value for each dollar they carved out and deposited into their personal accounts.
This reform would have no impact on the $10.4 trillion imbalance. Each dollar that the government loses in payroll contributions would be fully offset by a dollar that the government saves in present value of future benefit payments. Furthermore, unless capital markets responded in an uninformed manner (discussed in more detail later), this reform would not affect wages, interest rates or the Gross Domestic Product in any year. Neither would this reform change the net lifetime resources available to any household born at any time; in economic terms, this reform would be fully neutral.
Still, this reform would worsen all three of the traditional measures. The trust fund would become exhausted earlier because of the short-run decline in payroll contributions; similarly, the crossover date would occur sooner. The 75-year imbalance would also worsen because some of the benefit reduction would fall beyond the 75-year window.
Let's modify the example to consider a "carve out with a haircut." Under this approach, a participant's traditional Social Security benefit would be reduced by more than a dollar -say, $1.10 -for every dollar carved out and deposited into his or her personal account. A worker might be willing to take this "haircut" on his or her future benefits in order to obtain greater control over his or her retirement resources. Now, the $10.4 trillion imbalance would be reduced since the government saves more on benefit payments in present value than it loses in contributions. Still, the traditional measures of Social Security's finances would again worsen. 8 If policymakers, therefore, continued to focus on these traditional measures, this reform might be rejected even though it would improve Social Security's financial outlook. Because all calculations are made on a present value basis, this reform would actually improve Social Security's finances immediately -not just eventually.
In Table 1 shows that, based on calculations provided by the independent Office of the Actuary at Social Security, the Trustees estimate that past and current generations are projected to receive about $11.2 trillion more in benefits in present value than they will pay in taxes. In contrast, future generations (those aged 14 and younger in 2004 as well as the unborn) are projected to receive $0.8 trillion less in benefits than they will pay in taxes (see Table 1 ). The "overpayment" by future generations, though, is not enough to pay for the "overhang" of $11.2 trillion they are projected to inherit from current and past generations under current law. Either future generations will have to pay an additional $10.4 trillion in present value or generations alive today will have to make this sacrifice, or a combination of both.
New Accounting Measures
The open-group and closed-group measures are robust to the criticisms that apply to traditional measures of Social Security's finances-as note above. For example, both measures would correctly identify the economic as well as intergenerational neutralities of the actuarially fair carve out discussed earlier. In the case of a "carve out with a haircut," the open-group and closed-group measures would both decline, corresponding to a move toward sustainability and smaller burdens on future generations. In contrast, the traditional measures such as the trust fund exhaustion date and crossover date would both show a worsening of Social Security's finances.
Usefulness of the Closed-Group Measure
While the open-group measure obviously plays a very useful role in determining sustainability, the closed-group measure is not as widely understood. Still, the closed group measure plays a crucial role in understanding Social Security's impact on the economy.
Some believe that the closed group measure is mostly meaningful to the extent that the Social Security was intended by policymakers to be "fully funded" (Goss, 1999) . 11 In that case, the closed group obligation would be zero since each generation would pay its own benefits.
But the closed-group measure is a very important statistic even in a pay-as-you-go system for two key reasons. First, it indicates the extent that any reform will reshuffle fiscal burdens across generations. For example, supposed that Social Security benefits were increased and financed on a strict pay-as-you-go basis by increasing payroll taxes. This policy change would have no impact on the open group unfunded obligation measure nor any impact on any of the traditional measures of Social Security's finances discussed earlier. But the closed-group measure would increase because this reform would transfer wealth from future generations to current generations. Current generations would gain from this policy change since they will receive more in benefits in present value than they paid in taxes; indeed, current retirees would receive additional benefits for free. But future generations would pay for this windfall by receiving a benefit that is less valuable than the additional taxes they pay in present value. The closed-group measure will clearly indicate this intergenerational transfer.
Second, the closed-group measure indicates the extent that pay-as-you-go financing may "crowd out" private saving and, hence, increase interest rates, reduce wages, and reduce the nation's Gross Domestic Product.
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Consider again a pay-as-you-go financed increase in benefits. Because this reform transfers resources from future to current generations, it reduces 11 An equally plausible story is that policymakers allowed Social Security to become mostly pay-as-you-go over time because the burdens being placed on future generations were not easily observable under traditional measures. 12 The impact of Social Security financing on private saving is an empirical issue first analyzed by Feldstein (1974) .
the amount of money today's generations must save for their own retirement. This reform, therefore, could permanently reduce the economy's level of capital.
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The CBO (1998) estimates that one dollar's worth of closed-group obligations could reduce private saving between zero and $0.50, although this range of estimates is subject to considerable uncertainty. It follows that Social Security may reduce the U.S. capital stock by as much as $6 trillion and reduce GDP by as much as $1.1 trillion each year. 14 Nonetheless, as noted above, the traditional measures as well as the open-group measure do not indicate these large macroeconomic effects. Presumably, any discussion of Social Security reform would want to take into account the impact of a reform on the economy. Although Social Security has had many successes, its potentially large deleterious effect on the capital stock and national output probably deserves more attention in the debate over Social Security reform.
Long-Run versus Short-Run
Since the open-group measure extends the traditional 75-year imbalance measure beyond the 75 th year, one might at first be tempted to argue that the open-group measure places too much emphasis on Social Security's long run finances. In particular, one could imagine a hypothetical "reform" that does nothing to fix Social Security's finances during the first 75 years but enacts large reforms after the 75 th year in order to eliminate Social Security's $10.4 trillion imbalance.
This potential criticism, however, is misplaced since it forgets the fact that the $10.4 trillion open-group obligation measure is in present value terms. Besides adjusting for inflation, 13 The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, however, argues that parents might leave a larger bequest in response to a transfer from their children, thereby leaving national saving unchanged (Barro, 1974) . Altonji et al.'s (1992) empirical tests, however, reject this hypothesis. Consistently, Gokhale et al. (1996) trace a large share of the secular decline in U.S. national saving during the last several decades to the fiscal transfers from workers to retirees. 14 The calculated reduction in GDP assumes Cobb-Douglas production with inelastic labor supply, a net-ofdepreciation capital share of 0.25 and a current capital-output ratio of three. The calculation also assumes that the private saving offset is constant at $0.50 for each $1 of closed-group obligation. Moreover, a delay in attempting to bring Social Security's financial troubles under control would also be clearly indicated by the closed-group obligation measure. In particular, letting current generations "off the hook" by postponing reforms would produce a larger closedgroup obligation than a reform that required current generations to bear more of the costs.
Rather than drawing "too much" attention to the long run, the open-group and closedgroup obligation measures actually remove the current biases embedded in the traditional financial measures against reforms that could improve Social Security's long-run financial outlook. These newer measures also draw attention to the truer magnitude of the reforms that are needed to place Social Security on a sustainable path and, hence, indicate the urgent need for action. Social Security's open-group unfunded obligations of $10.4 trillion are almost three times as large as its imbalance over the next 75-years, despite the fact that shortfalls after the 75 th year are heavily discounted in the present value calculation, as discussed above.
Sensitivity to Assumptions
Another common criticism of present value estimates beyond 75 years is that they are sensitive to the underlying demographic and economic assumptions. 16 Of course, uncertainty should only enhance the desire to take remedies rather than to ignore the expected problem.
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Furthermore, as shown in Gokhale and Smetters (2003) , the size of the policy changeseither tax increase or benefit cuts -that are needed to reduce Social Security's imbalance are not affected by much under different interest rate and productivity assumptions and different demographic projections. Although the present value of the imbalance will be altered by changes in these underlying assumptions, the present value of Social Security's tax base and future benefits also move almost proportionally and in the same direction. As a result, the increases in tax rates or cuts in benefit rates required to eliminate Social Security's current fiscal imbalance exhibit little sensitivity to parametric changes in economic and demographic assumptions.
Improving the Federal Budget
Recently, numerous media organizations have reported that the "transition" to personal accounts would cost as much as $2 trillion over the first 10 years. However, these "transition costs" are often an artificial by-product of incomplete accounting in the current federal budget.
To be sure, diverting payroll tax revenue to personal accounts will increase the debt held by the public. But the concomitant reductions in the present value of future Social Security benefits are not counted in the current federal budget since it omits Social Security's unfunded obligations. As a result, an "actuarially-fair carve out," for example, appears to involve a shortterm "transition cost" in the form of more government debt even though the reform is neutral.
The President's 2005 Budget, like previous budgets, highlights the deficits projected over the next five years along with the amount of debt held by the public. The debt held by the public represents the net federal liabilities to the public accumulated from past overspending. Because this Budget is, in effect, "backward looking," it fails to account for the present value imbalances in Social Security, Medicare as well as other government programs.
The government's current backward-looking accounting would be illegal if done by companies in the private sector. Indeed, under ERISA and FASB rules, private-sector firms are required to make projections of their pension and retirement health obligations. 18 Although the methodology used in reporting future pension and other liabilities in the private sector is different than the one suggested here (arising from the fact that a private company cannot assume it will operating indefinitely into the future), the notion of complementing cash-flow-shortfall projections with present values of projected financial imbalances is not a very radical one. Although the President's Budget and the Trustees use similar demographic projections, the economic assumptions differ somewhat. Notice, for example, that we estimate Social Security's imbalance at $8 trillion (compared with the Trustees' estimate of $10.4 trillion) and 18 See, e.g., Howell Jackson (2004) and comments to his article appearing immediately after his article. 19 Our methodology is discussed in detail in Gokhale and Smetters (2003) . The current numbers update that report.
Augmenting the Federal Budget's Summary Tables
Medicare's imbalance at $61 trillion (compared with $62 trillion). 20 The main reason that our estimates are a little smaller than the Trustees is that we use a larger discount rate (a 3.6 percent inflation adjusted rate versus the Trustees' 3.1 percent rate). Our larger discount rate has a more noticeable effect in reducing Social Security's imbalance relative to Medicare's because Social Security's cash flow deficits are projected to occur at a later date than Medicare's. Table 2 shows that the Rest of the Federal Government actually has a present value surplus (negative imbalance) of about $5.6 trillion under current law. 21 The Rest of the Federal Government is equal to current level of debt held by the public plus the present value of expenditures on defense, Medicaid, education, homeland security and all other federal government programs (except Social Security and Medicare) less the present value of all federal revenue sources (except Social Security and Medicare Part-A payroll taxes).
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These calculations include all of the President's recently enacted and proposed policies.
Removing the Bias Against Pre-funding
Consider, now, how an "actuarially-fair carve out" would affect the more inclusive budget presented in Table 2 . Suppose that a person alive starting in 2004 is allowed to carve out $1 in 2004 and deposit it into a personal account in exchange for an actuarially-fair reduction in their future Social Security benefits equal to $1. 20 The Trustees' projected fiscal imbalance for Medicare (Parts A, B, and D) can be found in Tables IIB.11 , II.C16, and II.C22 of the 2004 Medicare Trustees' Report. The $62 trillion imbalance includes the present value of general revenue contributions for Parts B and D, which are not funded. Our own $61trillion calculation is larger than the value we reported in Gokhale and Smetters (2003) that was written before Part D became law. Another difference between our estimates and the Trustees' is that our estimates, like the budget, are stated in end-of-year dollars. 21 This calculation is larger in magnitude than the value we reported last year (Gokhale and Smetters, 2003) for the 2004 Budget, largely due to adjustments in economic and policy assumptions in the 2005 budget. 22 As Auerbach, Gale and Orszag (2004) point, however, our distinction between Medicare and the Rest of the Government is a little artificial since Medicare Parts B and D are partially financed by general revenue rather than with dedicated payroll taxes. We separate out Medicare because, similar to Social Security, it has been traditionally viewed as a distinct entitlement program even though payroll taxes cover only a small fraction of actual costs. In any case, the Total Fiscal Imbalance for the U.S. Government is unaffected by our decomposition.
The "Fiscal Imbalance in Social Security" in Table 2 6. "Implicit" Versus "Explicit" Debt Table 2 combines the government's "explicit debt" in the form of debt held by the public with the "implicit debt" debt in the form of the present value of future Social Security and Medicare benefits. Debt held by the public is a legal liability that must be honored by the government unless it declares bankruptcy. 23 Social Security and Medicare benefits, however, are only obligations of the government, which can be altered by an act of Congress.
It might appear at first that commingling implicit and explicit debt effectively "bonds" the value of Social Security and Medicare obligations, putting them on par with the liability to repay the debt held by the public. But this perspective, if valid, should also apply to the shortterm projections made in the current federal budget; the "projected" nature of the budget has not changed with the more inclusive measures. Indeed, unlike the current federal budget framework, the fiscal imbalance measure presented in Table 2 would clearly indicate the unsustainable nature of the federal government's fiscal policy.
Reaction of Capital Markets
In theory, real interest rates should not increase in response to an actuarially fair carveout reform of Social Security because investors should be indifferent between a dollar of explicit debt and a dollar of present value of future Social Security benefits. However, in practice, capital market participants may be discounting future Social Security benefits at a higher rate because they perceive that at least some of these benefits might not be paid. Replacing a dollar in present value of future Social Security benefits with a dollar of explicit debt, therefore, could worsen how investors perceive the outlook of the federal government's finances. 23 Of course, in practice, the government can use inflation to reduce the real value of nominally-denominated debt. The government would have to declare bankruptcy, however, to avoid paying off inflation-protected instruments.
Of course, it is not obvious that explicit debt liabilities are really more likely to be paid or serviced in real terms than Social Security obligations. Indeed, the opposite is feasible. Most explicit debt is nominally denominated and so its value could be easily eroded through a small increase in inflation compounded over time. In contrast, Social Security benefits, once determined, are fully protected against inflation, and they will likely remain so well into the future, especially as the share of retirees in the population increases over time.
However, even if the legal distinction between government debt liabilities and Social Security obligations is deemed important, the federal government's budget would be incomplete if it did not report all sources of projected outlays. The purpose of the budget is to show the projected financial ramifications of the continuation of current (or newly proposed) law -it is not meant to predict future law. Uncertainty about future law itself is more appropriately handled through policy, not by omitting the sources of promises under current law.
For example, if policymakers believe that market participants discount future Social Security benefits by 10 percent above the government's discount rate then policymakers could offer a carve out with a 10 percent "haircut" (as discussed earlier) to avoid disrupting capital markets. But, without any policy change, it would be inappropriate to simply discount future Social Security benefits in Table 2 by an extra 10 percent since that would not correspond to current law. Indeed, if federal budget projections incorporated the risks associated with how future policymakers might change the law, the very meaning of a budget would be undermined.
Policymakers would never have to worry about the financial ramifications of current (or proposed) laws because they could just assume that future policymakers would fix the problems.
By definition, there would never be a problem and, hence, no need for budget projections.
Instead, the ramifications of current law itself must be fully exposed as a precondition to enact change. We conjecture that the adoption of an inclusive budgetary framework, as shown in Table 2 , would signal that the government is now serious about reducing its fiscal imbalance, which would improve that capital market's outlook. As explained earlier, an actuarially fair carve-out does not reduce the federal government's fiscal imbalance. Rather, it is completely neutral. So the government would still have to either increase taxes or reduce the growth rate in benefits (maybe with a "haircut") in order to lower its fiscal imbalance. Officially acknowledging a fiscal imbalance in excess of $63 trillion, as shown in Table 2 , would likely prepare the environment for taking action sooner rather than later. If, instead, the fiscal imbalance were allowed to grow over time, it could further erode the confidence of market participants in the government's ability to meet its future obligations.
Conclusions
Traditional accounting measures tell us very little about the true fiscal problems facing the Social Security system, and they are biased against reforms that could reduce the federal government's fiscal imbalance. This paper presents an alternative and more inclusive budgetary framework, one that incorporates the present value imbalances in Social Security, Medicare, and all other government programs. The adoption of such a budgetary framework would remove an important accounting roadblock against Social Security reform. Explicitly recognizing the existing $63 trillion federal fiscal imbalance could also ease the way to fiscal reforms and likely improve the operation of capital markets. 
